Mark L. Johnson and Carol Ann Nielson v. Utah State Retirement Office : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2002
Mark L. Johnson and Carol Ann Nielson v. Utah
State Retirement Office : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark A. Madsen; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for Defendant-Respondent.
Stanford B. Owen; Fabian and Clendenin; Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Mark L. Johnson and Carol Ann Nielson v. Utah State Retirement Office, No. 20534.00 (Utah Supreme Court,
2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2019
UTAH SUPR£EJlfc CUUWI 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
45.9 
.S9 / 
D0CKETN0.^°5"3 7 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARK L. JOHNSON and CAROL ANN 
NIELSON, on behalf of themselves 
and as representatives of all 
others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT OFFICE, a 
Utah State Agency, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. :'C534 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, JUDGE 
Mark A. Madsen, A2351 
Attorney at Law 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
540 East Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 355-3884 
Stanford B. Owen, A2496 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
FILED 
JUL 1 7 1985 
Clark, Supreme Court, Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARK L. JOHNSON and CAROL ANN 
NIELSON, on behalf of themselves 
and as representatives of all 
others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT OFFICE, a 
Utah State Agency, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 20534 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, JUDGE 
Stanford B. Owen, A2495 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-
Appellants 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
Mark A. Madsen, A2051 
Attorney at Law 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
540 East Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 355-3884 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATUTE SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION iii 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LAW PLAINLY AND SPECIFICALLY DENIES THE 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFFS AND COMMANDS THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BELOW 3 • 
II. NO UTAH STATUTE OR CASE CAN REASONABLY BE * 
INTERPRETED TO AUTHORIZE THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
BY PLAINTIFFS 9 
III. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES MAY NOT BE APPLIED TO 
DEFEAT CLEAR STATUTORY TERMS, NOR DOES 
EQUITY AID PLAINTIFFS 12 
SUMMARY 15 
(i) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED: PAGE 
Billings v. City of Orlando,
 t 
287 S* 316 (Florida, 1973) 9 
Donald Bryson and Russell Nebeker, et a!. vs. Utah 
State Retirement Office, a Utah State Agency, 
573 P^ 1280 . . . . . . 1, 8, 9 
Driggs v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 
142 P^ 657 10 
Duff v. City of Gardena, 
167 Cal Rptr. 4 (1980) 9 
Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement System Board * 
of Administrators, 
—
 246 P^ 591 10 
Holmes v. City of Los Angeles, 
172 Cal Rptr. 585 (1981) . . . 9 
Kodish v. Public Employees Retirement Board, 
341 NE^ 320 (Ohio 1975) 9, 14 
Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 
520 F^ 993 (1975) . . 9 
Newcombe v. Ogden City Public School Teachers 
Reti rement Commission, 
243 P^ 941 (1952) 10, 11 
Robbins v. Police Pension Fund, 
32 F. Supp. 93 (1970) 9 
Stevens v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension 
Fund of the City of Shreveport, 
370 S^ 528 (1979) . . 9 
Williams v. Schrunk, 
527 P^ 1 (1974) 9 
(ii) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATUTES CITED: PAGE 
Utah Code Annotated, S 49-10-24 1, 5, 6, 11 
Utah Code Annotated,§ 49-10-2 1 
Utah Code Annotated, S 49-10-7 12 
Utah Code Annotated, s 49-10-49 12 
Senate Bill 327 (49-10-ll(4)(a) and (b) 6 
Laws of Utah, 1961, Chapter 100 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
STATUTE SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION 
Utah Code Annotated,g. 49-10-24: 
Options of terminating employee -- Withdrawal of 
accumulated contributions -- Inactive membership. ! 
If a member shall for any cause, except retirement, 
permanent or temporary disability or death, cease 
to be employed in covered services for an employer 
he may: 
(a) By written request directed to the retirement 
office receive a refund of all his accumulated contributions, 
less a withdrawal fee the amount of which the retirement board 
shall establish by regulation for the purpose of reimbursing 
its administrative fund for the cost entailed by said with-
drawal. In the event of such election, a terminating employee 
upon later re-employment by an employer under the provisions 
of this act, unless he redeposits his refund as herein permitted, 
shall be treated as a new employee and his service history and 
benefit rights shall then be based upon current services from 
the date of said re-employment in covered services. 
(b) Leave his account in the fund intact. In the 
event of such election, a terminating employee shall retain 
status as a member of the system, excepting for lack of con-
tributions paid into the fund by him or on his behalf. In the 
event of his re-employment by an employer for services covered 
by this act, his service history and benefit rights shall be 
based upon the prior service credit and current service credit 
accredited to him at the time of his most recent termination of 
employment, as well as upon the current service credit that he 
acquires as the result of his re-employment. 
Upon the attainment of retirement age, an active member 
shall have the same rights to receive retirement benefits, if 
eligible therefor, as any active employee member. 
(iii) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
It is the position of the Retirement respondents that 
49-10-24, U.C.A. 1953, as amended clearly applies by its terms to the 
individual plaintiffs and that it prohibits the granting of the relief 
sought by these individuals. The referenced statute provides in no 
uncertain terms that whenever a member of the Retirement System ceases 
"for any cause11 other than those provided for in the Retirement Act 
itself, i.e.; retirement, disability or death, to perform "Covered 
Services" that person's options are as provided in subsection (a) and 
(b) of the statute. I 
The individual plaintiffs seek to apply the rules and inter- ! 
pretations of private defined contribution plans to a public defined 
benefit plan in contravention of the law establishing it. 
Section 2 of Title 49, Chapter 10, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, 
is clear on its face. Prior interpretations of retirement law by this 
Court, and particularly, Donald Bryson and Russell Nebeker, et ajL^ , v. 
Utah State Retirement Office, a Utah State Agency, 573 P2 1280, are 
controlling on this issue. The legislature must have acknowledged power 
to determine the type of retirement plan which it will approve for 
public employees and the concomitant authority to determine the law and 
procedure under which it will operate. 
Equity as well as law favors the decision of the Court below. 
Although attempts are made to assert a principle of unjust enrichment,it 
is clear from the facts on their face that the remaining employees under 
-1-
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the system will be called upon to subsidize the approximately 49 
employees of plaintiffs employers who have or will retire from the 
system. (R - 128- 130 and unnumbered affidavit of Robert Drisko) 
Under the law of the jurisdictions which allow employer unit 
withdrawal for any reason other than loss of public funding, Payson City 
Hospital would have been required to reimburse the Retirement Board when 
it went private. 
To accede to the individual plaintiffs demands in this case 
would reverse the whole history of public defined benefit retirement 
plans and open a Pandora's Box of consequences. Private defined I 
contribution plan law is simply not relevant to this issue. * 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Utah State Retirement Defendant-Respondents take no 
serious issue with the STATEMENT OF THE CASE and the STATEMENT OF 
FACTS presented by Plaintiffs-Appellants in their brief except in 
some instances the emphasis and interpretation drawn therefrom. 
Their assumptions both of law and fact are deemed erroneous and will 
be dealt with hereafter in detail. 
A R G U M E N T 
I. THE LAW PLAINLY AND SPECIFICALLY DENIES THE RELIEF 
SOUGHT BY THE PLAINTIFFS AND COMMANDS THE JUDGMENT 
OF THE COURT BELOW. 
The sole issue of this case is the liability of the Retirement 
defendants to pay as "refund" the employer contribution to individuals 
who have ceased to perform "Covered Services" for an employer under 
the Utah State Retirement Act. Erroneous and statutorily unathorized 
assumptions must be made in order for that question even to be raised. 
First it must be recognized that we are here concerned with 
the implementation of a public retirement system, created and governed 
by legislative authority and not by "negotiation" and "contract" as in 
private systems. Thus, it is pointless to spend time examining the 
laws, rules, or procedures governing private systems. These two are 
clearly noncomparable at this point, and legal and equitable rules 
cannot be used interchangeably. Thus, we will not attempt to 
distinquish or otherwise attack the legal sanctity of the private 
cases upon which the plaintiffs-appellants rely. 
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In public retirement systems in the several jurisdictions of 
the United States, there are two distinct types of plans. Each has 
its own advantage and disadvantages to both employers and employees, 
but once adopted by the authorized legislative body the rules of one 
cannot be applied to the other to vary its application. This is 
exactly what plaintiffs seek to do. 
Briefly, a DEFINED CONTRIBUTION plan may be considered to 
require specified contributions from the employer and/or the employee 
which vests in the employee either immediately or at a specified subse-
quent date. The contributions and interest, wherever and however 
invested, are deemed to be the property of the employee after vesting 
and may be withdrawn in full upon termination of employment with the 
participating employer. In fact, the employee assumes all investment 
risk and may theoretically have nothing either at retirement or termina-
tion of covered employment. This system is, in essence, a savings and 
investment plan and not a retirement plan as such. 
Conversely, a DEFINED BENEFIT plan places all the investment 
risk upon the employer. When the employee attains the age and years 
of service specified in law he is entitled to a specified monthly 
retirement benefit for life, based on those years and age and a set 
percentage formula without reference to the actual funds oaid in or 
the success, or otherwise, of the investments made by trustees. While 
the employees rights vis-a-vis retirement "vest11 at a statutorily 
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established point (4 years, 10 years, etc.), this vesting relates only 
to retirement and has no reference to receipt of employer or, indeed, 
employee contributions upon termination, except as provided in the 
enabling legislation. Without exception, public defined benefit 
plans prohibit the payment to individual employees of the employer 
contribution except under the purposes specified in the enabling 
legislative enactment - the law. 
Utah adopted in 1961 (Laws of Utah, 1961, Chapter 100) and is 
now operating a DEFINED BENEFIT plan. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that the law governing this action, 49-10-24, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, I 
specifies the payment to an employee of only M s contributions if he so * 
elects upon his ceasing to "be employed in covered services for an 
employer." 
It is difficult to imagine specific language more to the 
point than is the section in controversy when it says: 
If a member shall for an^ cause, except retirement, 
permanent or temporary disability or death, cease 
to be employed in covered services for an employer 
he may: (emphasis added) 
There follows the option of receiving a refund of his contributions 
(which has been interpreted to include interest at the assumed rate) or 
leaving the money in and later receiving a retirement benerit earned, if 
and when qualified. 
Retirement, permanent or temporary disability and death are 
the statutory "benefits'1 provided by the law. Since the defined 
benefit plan is not a savings account for an individual employee (as 
-D-
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a defined contribution plan may be considered to be), early termination 
refund is not considered to be a "benefit" under the law. 
On the facts and the law it is difficult to understand why 
the plaintiffs persist in arguing that section 24 does not apply to 
them and that the legislature did not consider their case. While it 
is true that the legislature, in enacting section 24, did not itemize 
"other causes," it did specifically state "for any cause" other than 
the specified benefits of the plan. Can it really be argued that 
unless legislation specifies a particular set of circumstances it may 
not deal with such in a broad, general, exclusive way? This would 
indeed be a novel approach to statutory construction. 
It is scarcely arguable that the plaintiffs-appellants have 
ceased "to be employed in covered services " And certainly, it is 
for some cause (any cause) except retirement, permanent or temporary 
disability or death. Thus, it is squarely within the terms of the law 
and the options are clear. 
While the law is deemed remarkably clear as heretofore sug-
gested, it is significant that in 1983 under legislation termed 
"clarifying legislative intent" the legislature, in enacting Senate 
Bill 327, specified that section 24 would be applicable in the event 
a unit were to withdraw with retirement board approval for loss of 
public funding. Since that language is intended to be clarifying 
but, even more clearly because it does not alter the law in any real 
degree as it existed in section 24, this cannot be reasonably argued 
to be prohibitive retroactive legislation. 
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It is significant that if this Court were to reverse the 
lower court and grant the relief urged by the plaintiffs-appellants, 
it would be a direct reversal of the law in this jurisdiction and in 
every other jurisdiction in these United States (where it was followed) 
as it relates to public defined benefit plans. 
The actuarial rate is determined and the employer-employee 
contributions fixed in a defined benefit plan upon the assumption 
that the employer contribution is in all cases, other than to receive 
the benefits of the plan, nonrefundable. (R - 128 - 130 and unnumbered 
affidavit of Robert Drisko P. 3 - no objection) Thus, the mischief * 
inevitably resulting from judicial reinterpretations of this well * 
established and, indeed, fundamental rule must be incalculable. The 
whole funding base would have to be reconsidered and recalculated. 
Plaintiffs-appellants would have us believe that theirs is 
a unique situation and we can accede to their demands without opening 
Pandora's Box. This is demonstrably untrue. Payson City Hospital was 
not the first, nor the last, to go private, and it is difficult to 
understand why they would argue that a reinterpretation of this basic 
rule of public defined benefit plans should apply only to them. 
This Court has heretofore followed a long line of decisions 
on the subject of refunds to terminating employees. This is not a 
case of first impression. Until recently the public safety and 
firemen's systems provided for the refund to terminating employees 
of only 80% of their contributions. It is suggested that the sustain-
ing of such a law must put to rest the question of refunding employer 
-7-
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contributions. The Retirement defendants asked the court to sustain 
that law and in doing so to reverse the lower court in Weber County, 
which it did in Donald Bryson and Russell Nebeker, et aj_, y^ Utah State 
Retirement Office, a Utah State Agency, 573 P2 1280. With refer-
ence to refund the Court said, in a unanimous decision: 
The obligation to return contributions to employees 
who terminate is an important cost factor in operat-
ing a retirement system. It is to be realized that 
the retention of a percentage helps to pay the cost 
of its maintenance and operation. This tends to 
keep the system solvent and better able to pay 
pensions to those who serve until retirement, all 
of which contributes to making it a better system. 
It is respectfully argued that this decision is controlling 
in this case, dealing as it does with a percentage of employee contri-
butions not refundable. Under a public defined benefit plan the 
employer contribution has neyer in any jurisdiction in the United 
States been deemed to have ever become the "property" of the employee. 
A rule sustaining refundability of less than the whole of an employee's 
own contributions must certainly apply with much greater force, 
therefore, to funds which were neyer deemed his nor payable to 
him under any circumstances, except as provided in the plan. 
We have been unable to locate a single case in which a court 
of this or any sister jurisdiction has ordered the payment to a term-
inating employee (or one who ceases to perform "covered service" for an 
employer) of more than the amount specified in the law. Contrarily, 
the following courts have sustained the law of the several jurisdic-
tions, even disallowing a refund of any sums at all where the law so 
provided: 
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Kodish v^ Pub Iic Employees Retirement Board, 341 NE^ 
320 (Ohio, 1975) - only the principal of his own 
contributions; Billings v^ City of Orlando 287 S 2 
316 (Florida, 1973) - only 50% of sums deducted from 
their salaries; and Wi "i 1 iams v^ Schrunk, 527 P^l 
(1974); Holmes v. City of Los' Angeles, 172 Cal Rptr. 
585 (1981); Rob bins v_^  Police Pension Fund, 32 F. 
Supp. 93 (1970): Duff v^ City of Gardena, 167 Cal 
Rptr. 4 (1980): Stevens v^ Board of Trustees erf the 
Police Pension Fund of th£ City of Shreveport, 370 
S^ 528 (1979); and Muzquiz v^ City erf San Antonio, 
520 F2 993 (1975) all of which- later cases allowed 
the plaintiffs to recover nothing of even their own 
contributions in face of a statute to the contrary. 
It is respectfully suggested that plaintiffs here as elsewhere 
I 
may recover only the amounts or proportions of their own contributions 
specified in the law and none of the employer contribution except as 
provided by law. It is further suggested that both statutory and con-
trolling case law in this jurisdiction clearly and emphatically denies 
the relief sought by plaintiffs-appellants ana requires tne sustaining 
of the judgment of the lower court. 
II. NO UTAH STATUTE OR CASE CAN REASONABLY BE INTERPRETED 
TO AUTHORIZE THE RELIEF SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFFS. 
Because plaintiffs have sought to sustain their theory by 
appeal to several Utah Cases dealing with public retirement, it is 
deemed appropriate to canvass their cases. Let it be stated at the 
outset that the Retirement defendants do not take issue with the 
specific holding of any of their cases and asserts that they are 
simply not apropos to the issue here, which is controlled by Bryson 
and Nebeker, supra. 
-9-
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In ruling as the Court did in Hansen v^ Public Employees 
Retirement System Board of Administrators, 246 P2 591, it upheld 
the power and authority of the legislature. This case involved the 
termination of the public plan then mandated by federal law in order 
to secure Social Security coverage. It is significant that this case 
deals with a terminating plan, not a continuing plan. The legislature 
broadened the eligibility of certain classes to obtain "vesting" spe-
cifically because of the termination. But while permitting a broadened 
class (not al1 employees) to obtain some otherwise prohibited benefit 
from the employer contributions, the legislature did not authorize, in 
any case, the payment of such contributions to individual employees. ' 
Some did not have service credit to obtain even this broadened partici-
pation. The legislature drew the lines and the court sustained them. 
Those who were within certain well defined lines could elect to either 
take a refund of their own contributions, qjr obtain a paid up annuity 
using both the employer and employee contributions. Since this was a 
terminating plan, the logic of this case is compelling both legislative-
ly and judicially but, attempting to apply it to the facts of this case 
is like building a bridge across the Pacific Ocean from California to 
Japan. It is totally impractical. 
Similarly, we have no argument with the holding of either 
Driggs v^ Utah State Teachers Retirement Board 142 P2 6.57, or Newcombe 
v^ Ogden City Public School Teachers Retirement Commission, 243 P2 941. 
-10-
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In the former case, we insist that members do have "inchoate contractual 
rights, which upon completion of conditions precedent to retirement and 
actual retirement, ripen into vested rights." The trouble here is that 
as a result of no fault on the part of these retirement defendants, 
the plaintiffs did not, in fact, complete the conditions precedent. 
Nor do we take issue with Newcombe, that "the right to a 
pension becomes so much a part of the agreed compensation for the 
service of the employee as the monthly stipend, but it is deferred in 
payment until after his retirement." But the employee must qualify 
under the terms of the contract, which these plaintiffs have demon-
 f 
strably failed to do. Thus, the legislature has both a right and a ? 
duty to otherwise provide, which it has in section 24. 
If these plaintiffs have a justifiable complaint it is 
against the City of Payson and/or the Payson City Hospital . . . 
not these defendants. The issue of whether or not these entities are 
indispensable parties has no bearing on that factual situation. 
Plaintiffs have presented all the classic arguments favoring 
in the beginning the adoption of a defined contribution plan for 
public employees. But, since our legislature opted to establish a 
defined benefit plan instead, those arguments are both too late and 
too little. 
The legislature placed responsibility upon each member "to 
acquaint himself with his rights and obligations as a member of the 
-11- . 
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system.1' 49-10-49, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. Since the system does 
not contemplate the payment to a terminating member "for any cause" of 
the employer contributions, but contrarily, has built into the actuarial 
base a percentage of employer contributions not paid out and thus 
available to retirees, this should in all conscience settle the issue. 
Plaintiffs' reference to 49-10-7, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, in 
aid of their cause is sadly miscited since that statute militates 
strongly against them. When the legislature stated "It is hereby 
declared to be the policy of the legislature that this act be liberally 
construed sc) that the benefits and protections as herein provided shal 1 i 
be extended <as broadly as reasonably possib1e(.)," (emphasis added) * 
It cannot reasbnably be interpreted to intend benefits exactly opposite 
to those "herein provided" as plaintiffs seek here. The benefits are 
as already established by the legislature to be retirement, normal or 
disability, and death benefits arid nothing else. Certainly not a 
savings account via payment of employer contributions. 
III. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES MAY NOT BE APPLIED TO DEFEAT CLEAR 
STATUTORY TERMS, NOR DOES EQUITY AID PLAINTIFFS. 
Plaintiffs continue to urge some principle of unjust enrich-
ment as an aid to their cause, thus appealing to principles of equity. 
It is axiomatic that he who seeks equity must do equity. Nowhere in 
the pleadings or arguments of plaintiffs do they recognize the liabil-
ity which the Retirement defendants have been required to assume for 
-12-
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the employees of plaintiffs' employer, Payson City Hospital, who had 
previously retired or who elected, as noted in Appellant's brief at 
page 9, to take an early retirement or to leave their contributions in 
for a later retirement upon qualification. The records of the 
Retirement Office disclose that some 33 persons had retired from 
Payson City Hospital prior to the events here involved, together with 
the 10 who chose to leave their contributions in for later retirement, 
and the 6 who chose early retirement (R - 128 - 130). There is then a 
total of approximately 49 persons from Payson City Hospital whose 
retirement must be funded. Under a defined contribution program it * 
would be immaterial, but under the defined benefit plan of this State * 
it is highly significant. Is it equitable to shift the financial 
responsibility for all these retirees to the other members while these 
plaintiffs claim benefits beyond and above the law? This is a perfect 
example of the continuing effort of these plaintiffs to apply the rules 
of a defined contribution plan to a defined benefit plan in clear con-
travention of existing law, both statutory and judicial. 
There are defined benefit plans in the public sector which 
are more liberal in permitting employer unit withdrawal. The California 
and Montana plans are cases in point. However, there is not a single 
public defined benefit plan which permits the payment of arr^  portion 
of the employer contributions to employees in the event of such unit 
withdrawal. No statute and no judicial action has ever countenanced 
-13-
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the relief sought by these plaintiffs. How then does equity come to 
their aid in clear contravention of law? Equity may be invoked where 
the law is silent, not; in direct contravention of statutory mandate. 
Further, plaintiffs have ignored the fact that each of them 
has received some benefit from their participation in the State 
Retirement System. In the event any of them had incurred a covered 
disability or had died during retirement coverage, a benefit under the 
plan would have been payable. The costs of this coverage are not 
acknowledged anywhere by plaintiffs, although this cost is attributable 
to them. See Kodish y^ Public Employees Retirement Board, op cit, 341 I 
NE 2 320 (Ohio 1975). * 
Plaintiffs do not come before this Court with clean hands 
and may not invoke equity thusly. 
Is it assumed that the funds of Payson City Hospital and its 
employees were managed and invested over a period in excess of fifteen 
years without cost and expense? While unacknowledged by plaintiffs, 
it needs no proof that costs were incurred. 
The foregoing all goes to establish the rational difference 
between defined contribution and defined benefit public plans and why 
the legislature was not insensitive or irrational in denying payment 
of employer contributions to employees no longer in "Covered Services." 
-14-
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Neither law nor equity is of aid to these plaintiffs as they seek to 
recover sums universally denied public employees under defined benefit 
plans in the jurisdictions of the United States. 
S U M M A R Y 
it is respectfully urged that legislative statement of law 
and policy and the prior decisions of this Court sustain the judgment 
of the lower court and the action of the Utah State Retirement Board 
in refusing to pay over to plaintiffs all or any part of the employer 
contributions of Payson City Hospital. The judgment of the lower court 
should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
)a^A^ K: 
larlt A. Madsen 
Atyorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Utah State Retirement Office 
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